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Information Impacts and Determinants of
Information Selection:  An Experimental Approach
Fred J. Ruppel and Stephen W.  Fuller
Laboratory experimentation was used to assess the impacts of information disclosure in
imperfect  markets. A dual oligopoly market structure was designed with contract infor-
mation  disclosed  to  subjects  under  three treatments:  no,  partial,  and  full  disclosure.
Regression analysis revealed some increase in selling price with full information disclo-
sure, but no discernable  effects on negotiated prices  with partial disclosure. Alternative
specifications  showed  large traders  earning significantly  lower  profits, and information
on large  traders  significantly  beneficial  to  both  buyers  and  sellers.  Probit  analysis  of
information selection  determinants  revealed no significant economic  content in trader
requests for information under  partial disclosure.
Key  words:  experimental  economics,  grain  transportation,  imperfect  markets,  infor-
mation impacts, transportation.
Historically economists have looked to neoclassical economic theory, to game theory, and to the structure-
conduct-performance  paradigm to evaluate  the performance  of particular markets.  Unfortunately,  only
some of the more relevant and interesting questions regarding market performance are addressed by these
methods.  One  question  in particular  where  theory  offers  only modest  insight concerns  the  impact of
information  on prices  and  market  efficiency  in imperfect  markets.  Carlton and Perloff suggested  two
strands of research  that are related to information  and imperfect  markets.  The first has focused on the
cost of the information search.  While neoclassical theory presumed that a market equilibrium with low
search  costs would  be  similar  to  an equilibrium  with  zero  search  costs,  Diamond showed  that  with
infinitesimal  search  costs and  a large  number of firms,  the market equilibrium  price is the  monopoly
price. However, if there are only a few sellers in the market, price-cutting may be profitable and the higher
price equilibrium would be broken.  Also, when free entry is allowed,  monopoly profits are dissipated by
excessive entry. Finally, if sellers cooperate and collectively lower prices, buyers may be induced to search
for even lower prices, further lowering price below the monopolistic level. Thus, the reasoning by Diamond
suggests a set of results very different from a market where buyers  have full information.
The  second  strand  of research  has to  do  with  asymmetrically  held  information.  Salop and  Stiglitz
concluded  that if there  are many informed  buyers,  sellers  will have little incentive  to  deviate from the
competitive  equilibrium,  whereas  if there  are  few  informed buyers,  a two-price  equilibrium  develops,
with low-priced sellers charging a price equal to marginal cost and high-priced sellers selling at monopolistic
prices. In addition, Salop showed that a monopolist may benefit by charging different prices to informed
and uninformed buyers,  since search costs would prevent uninformed consumers from buying at the low
price. Perloff and Rausser  effectively summarized the ambiguity surrounding the impacts of asymmetric
information in imperfect markets when they concluded that
...  an increase in information known to the competitive fringe firms can increase  or decrease
the distortions  in various  agricultural  markets.  This ambiguous result  ...  reflects  the general
principle  that,  in moving  from  one second-best  world to another,  there  is  no assurance  that
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society's  welfare is enhanced.  What at  first may seem  a paradox-improved  information  may
be harmful-is  a general result that should be expected.  (pp. 371-72)
Because  traditional  economic theory offers  little to assess the impacts of information  on behavior in
imperfect markets, economists increasingly have turned to laboratory experimentation  (Plott; Smith). In
particular, the impact of information disclosure in a dual oligopoly setting is uncertain. Depending upon
prior history and the acceptance of certain behavioral assumptions, a number of theoretical outcomes are
possible.1 The intent of this article is to examine the effect of selective contract information disclosure on
prices and profits in a  dual oligopoly laboratory setting  characteristic  of the market for rail services in
the Great Plains. An earlier empirical analysis showed rail rates in the region have  edged upward since
legislation requiring  mandatory contract disclosure was authorized in  1986 (Fuller, Ruppel, and Bessler).
However, other factors, such as dynamic negotiating relationships,  the increased demand for U.S. wheat
and coarse grain exports in the late 1980s, increases in rail input costs (labor, fuel, materials), and changing
seasonal  demands  for grain transportation  services,  may have  been responsible  for this  outcome.  The
advantage  of the laboratory setting is to allow for control of the influence of these other elements.
Background
Both the  rail carriers and  the contracting  grain shippers  in the  Plains states  are  characterized by  high
concentration  ratios  in their  industries.  The  Staggers  Rail  Act  of 1980  permitted  railroads  and  grain
shippers to enter into  confidential contracts. Some  shippers argued that the price confidentiality  feature
of  rail contracts enhanced interrailroad competition (Milling and  BakingNews), while other shipper groups,
such as the National  Grain and Feed Association, argued that the high volume contract rates offered to
large shippers  discriminated against  smaller shippers. Legislation  passed  in 1986 modified the Staggers
Act by authorizing  two levels of disclosure of confidential contract terms. First-tier disclosure, which we
refer to as partial disclosure, included such items as shipper identity; origins, destinations, transit points,
and  movement types  (single car, multiple car, unit trains, etc.);  contract duration and  implementation
dates; volume  requirements;  commodities covered;  and base rates which would apply in the absence of
a contract. Second-tier disclosure, which we call full disclosure, included information on actual rates and
charges  in the contract. This information, which is typically the most important bit of information  sought
by a petitioning shipper, was not to be disclosed until a petitioning shipper (a) filed a petition for discovery
of additional  contract terms;  (b) could  show  that it was  ready,  willing,  and  able to  participate  in the
contract  terms covered  under first-tier  disclosure;  and  (c)  could  show  itself to  be an  "affected  party"
(Federal  Register).
Similar issues have been analyzed using laboratory experiments. Hong and Plott employed a laboratory
setting to explore the consequences of a proposed rate publication  policy for the U.S. barge industry. The
proposed policy required  a carrier to file a rate change  with the Interstate Commerce  Commission (ICC)
at least  15  days before  the rate change  was to become  effective. In laboratory markets,  Hong and Plott
contrasted the proposed posted rate policy with negotiated  rates  and found that  posting caused higher
prices, lower  volume, and reduced  efficiency.  Claims that rate  filing would  improve market  operations
were not supported  by the  experimental  results.  Grether and Plott examined  the relationship  between
posted prices and certain industrial practices by an oligopoly of  lead-based gasoline additive manufacturers.
The Federal Trade Commission charged that an existing price posting policy was anticompetitive,  while
the manufacturers maintained that the pricing outcomes were simply the result of the highly concentrated
market  structure.  Grether  and  Plott used laboratory  experiments to refute  the  oligopolists'  claim  that
concentration  alone, unaided by certain practices,  did not necessarily foster collusion-like prices. Further
studies which  are  somewhat  related to the proposed  analysis include those  by Plott and  Smith and by
Williams.
Methods
A laboratory  experiment  was constructed  to represent a dual oligopoly market  structure.2 Twelve two-
hour sessions were held. Each session consisted of eight training/trading periods (as described below). Six
student volunteers  per session  were randomly  assigned buyer or  seller trading status.  Each side  of the
market had one large trader,  each controlling  50% of its respective market, and two smaller traders, each
with one-quarter market shares. The subjects were instructed to buy (sell) units of a commodity from one
of the three traders on the other side of the market.  Buyers had demand schedules  reflecting resale values
and sellers had supply schedules reflecting  costs of production. Three  sets of market demand and supply
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Figure 1.  Supply and demand possibilities
Note: LD, MD, HD,  LS, MS, HS refer to low,  moderate, and high demand and supply, both respectively.
Numbers in parentheses refer to experimental periods.
schedules (reflecting  low, moderate,  and high demand/supply  conditions)  generated  nine possible  equi-
librium points (fig.  1). Each buyer (seller) was allowed to negotiate a maximum of three trades per trading
period,  one trade with each  seller  (buyer).3 Prices  and quantities  traded  were negotiable  items.  Buyers
profited from purchasing  units at a low price relative  to their resale values. Sellers profited from selling
units at a high price relative to their production  costs.4
Subjects were placed in separate  offices on one  floor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at
Texas A&M University. Each buyer (seller) had two phone lines available for his/her use, with two phone
numbers  listed  for each  of the sellers  (buyers) but  no communications  available  to  competing buyers
(sellers). Two 15-minute training periods were held, followed by six 10-minute trading periods. The training
periods were designed to familiarize the subjects with the trading environment incrementally. The trading
price was  fixed during the first training period with the subjects  allowed to conduct as many trades and
to transact as many units as they desired. A maximum number of units to be traded was imposed during
the second training period with prices negotiable. Training periods 1 and 2 were high demand-high supply
(HDHS) and low demand-low supply (LDLS),  respectively.
Participant  payouts  were based  on profits earned during  periods  3 through 8. Periods  3 and  6  were
"transition"  periods  with moderate demand and moderate supply (MDMS). Periods 4 and 7 were "base-
line"  periods,  and were  either  high demand-low  supply  (HDLS) or low  demand-high  supply  (LDHS)
equilibria.  If period  4  was  HDLS,  then  period  7  was  LDHS,  and  vice  versa.  Periods  5 and  8 were
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Table 1.  Summary Results on Quantities Traded, Prices, and Profits for Baseline and Disclosure Periods
for Large and Small Buyers  and Sellers
Perfectly Efficient Solution (PES)a
Small
Large Buyer  Small Buyers  Large Seller  Sellers
Quantity (units)b  49  24  49  24
Average Equilibrium Price (cents)  80  80  80  80
Actual  Outcomes for Baseline  and Disclosure  Periods
Small Buyers  Small Sellers
Large  Buyer  (combined)  Large  Seller  (combined)
Quantity (%  of PES)  83.1  101.7  81.5  103.3
Price (cents)  81.1  77.4  76.6  80.6
Profits (%  of PES)  90.5  99.8  81.6  94.7
Number of Trades  137  124.5  142  122
Maximum Number of Trades  144  144  144  144
a The PES  is calculated at equilibrium  prices  and allocation  quantities.
b The 50th and 25th units are inframarginal  for the large and small traders, respectively.  If traded at the equilibrium
price, these units would bring neither profit nor loss to either buyers  or sellers.
"disclosure" periods, and had the same equilibria  as their preceding  period. The baseline and disclosure
periods had equilibrium prices of$ 1  and 60¢ for HDLS and LDHS, respectively, and equilibrium quantities
of 100  throughout.  Absolute  values of the slopes  of the  schedules  were  identical between buyers  and
sellers,  with the slopes  for the small traders  twice as  steep  as  for the large  traders. At the end of each
session the subjects were paid pre-ordained  fixed percentages of the sum of their six trading period profits
for the evening.  Percentages  were set so that the anticipated  payout of $18  was identical  for each market
participant.5
The experiment was designed to test the impact of selective information disclosure on buyer and seller
profits,  prices,  and  quantities.  The  12  experimental  sessions  were  equally  divided  into  one  of three
information disclosure treatments:  none (NO), partial (PT),  and full (FL). Under  the NO treatment,  no
information on previously traded quantities  or prices was made available to the traders. Under FL, prior
to trading in periods  5 and  8  all participants  received a listing of all trades  contracted during  the prior
trading period. Under PT, following periods  4 and 7  traders were allowed to request information on two
trades from the prior period.  Each of these requests specified  (a) a particular buyer or seller involved in
a trade and  (b) a particular  piece of information  on the trade:  either the  first trade,  the last trade, the
largest  quantity traded,  the smallest quantity traded,  the highest  contract price,  or the lowest contract
price associated with the trader specified in (a). It was expected that full disclosure of prior-period trading
information  would reduce  excessive  trader profits by lowering  excessively high seller prices and raising
abnormally  low buyer prices and by increasing the quantity traded for all traders. That is, positive signs
were expected on full disclosure in explaining price, quantity, or profit differences between trading periods.
On the other hand, it was expected that traders would use selected information  (PT disclosure) to their
benefit,  raising seller prices and lowering buyer prices, and increasing profits and quantities traded for all
traders.
Results
The  experiment  was  conducted  over  a one-month  period.  Individual  trades  within  each  period  were
aggregated  into period-  and trader-specific  quantities,  quantity-weighted  prices, and  profits, resulting in
288 observations of baseline and disclosure periods  (6 traders*4 periods* 12 sessions).
Summary Results
Summary results on quantities,  prices, and profits in the baseline and disclosure periods  are presented in
table  1. Following  Plott  and Smith,  a  perfectly  efficient  market  standard was  established  in order  to
measure  overall trader  efficiency.  This  standard assigned period-specific  equilibrium  prices to all trades
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Table 2.  Summary of Information Requested  under Partial Disclosure
Information  Requested on Trader
Small Buyers  Small Sellers
Large Buyer  (combined)  (combined)  Large Seller  Sum
By Buyers  2  4  26  16  48
By  Sellers  17  24  7  0  48
Total  19  28  '33  16  96
Information  Requested on Trade
First  Last  Large  Small  High  Low
Trade  Trade  Quant  Quant  Price  Price  Sum
By Buyers  2  3  9  0  3  31  48
By Sellers  14  8  7  0  16  3  48
Total  16  11  16  0  19  34  96
and quantity  allocations  (equal to the quantity  supplied  or demanded  at the  equilibrium  price) to  all
traders. Given the inframarginal nature of the last unit, this perfectly efficient solution (PES) was 97 units
traded per session (24 units for each of the smaller traders and 49 units for the larger traders). The mean
of the actual units traded in the baseline and disclosure  periods over all  12 sessions was  89.5 units per
period, which  amounted to  92.3% of the PES.  On average,  the small traders exceeded  their allocations,
while the large traders fell far short in their quantities  traded. The smaller traders also engaged in fewer
trades  overall.  The  386  contracts  negotiated  during  the baseline  and disclosure  periods  amounted to
slightly more than eight trades  per period, one  less than the maximum potential number of trades per
period.  The large traders on both sides of the market averaged over 95% of their maximum number of
trades, while the small buyers  averaged only 86%.
Prices in the aggregate  also favored the small traders  over the large  traders, but also favored  buyers
over sellers. With a mean equilibrium  price of 80¢ per unit for the baseline and disclosure periods, the
mean of quantity-weighted  contract prices per period was  79¢ per unit. Zero-sum games  were in effect
for nonequilibrium  prices. That is, contract prices above or below the equilibrium price generated rents
to the seller or buyer, respectively.  Relative to the equilibrium  price, the large buyer  (on average) paid
1.  1¢ too much, while the small buyers  were under by  2.6¢ per unit. On the other hand, the large  seller
received  3.4¢ too little, while the small sellers  were over, but only by .6¢. Overall, the buyer advantage
amounted  to just over  1  per unit.
The  combined  deviations  from  equilibrium  prices  and  allocation  quantities  resulted  in substantial
differences in profits. Overall, small buyers achieved 99.8% of their PES profits, followed by small sellers
at 94.7%, with the large buyer and seller at 90.5% and  81.6%, respectively.  Although actual  payout for
all traders for the baseline and disclosure periods amounted to 96.7% of the expected level,  profits were
only at 91.7% of the standard. This discrepancy was the result of the small traders being more successful
than the large traders and receiving  higher payout percentages.
Partial  Disclosure Information Selection
The information the traders could have selected can be classified into five categories:  side of the market,
size of the trader, order of the trade, trading price, and trading quantity. The first two of these categories
pertain to a trader's request for information on other traders. As shown in table 2, both buyers and sellers
overwhelmingly  preferred  information on traders from the opposite side of the market.  Only six buyer
requests and seven seller requests (out of a possible 48 requests on each side of the market) were for the
same side of the market. Information requests on size were likewise fairly equally distributed, with buyers
requesting information on a large trader  18 times and sellers requesting large trader information  17 times
(again out of a possible 48).
The latter  three categories  pertain to the type of information  requested.  There  were  nine buyer and
seven seller requests for the largest quantity traded (by a given buyer or seller), and no requests for smallest
trade information. Again, these numbers are similar for buyers and sellers. However,  dramatic differences
appeared  in requests for prices and order of trade information.  Buyers  requested price  information  34
times versus  19  seller requests, while sellers made 22 order-of-trade requests compared to five for buyers.
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Table 3.  Variable Identification and Description
Variable
Identification  Description
DPROFIT  Change in trader profits between a baseline  period (4, 7) and a disclosure period (5, 8)
DPRI  Change in quantity-adjusted trading price between a baseline period (4, 7) and a disclosure peri-
od (5, 8)
DQTY  Change in quantity traded between a baseline period (4, 7) and a disclosure period (5, 8)
LPRI  Quantity-adjusted trading price  lagged one period
LQTY  Quantity traded lagged one period
NTRDS  Number of trades in previous period
LRGE  0-1 variable  denoting large trader (buyer or seller)
FULL  0-1 variable  denoting full disclosure period
PART  0-1 variable  denoting partial disclosure  period
RLRGE  0-1 variable,  request for information  on large trader
RSAME  0-1 variable,  request for information  on trader on same side of market
RORD  0-1  variable, request for information  on order of trade
RQTY  0-1  variable, request for information  on quantity traded
RPRI  0-1  variable, request for information  on trading price
SLR  0-1  variable denoting sellers
EQ60  0-1  variable denoting periods when equilibrium  price was 60
PD8  0-1  variable denoting period 8
SN1  0-1  variable denoting session  1
SN2  0-1  variable denoting session 2
SN8  0-1  variable denoting session 8
SLPRI  0-1  variable, interaction between LPRI and SLR
The large seller was especially concerned with order, having requested order-of-trade information  11 times
(out of a maximum of 16 requests). It is possible that the experimental design encouraged (or even forced!)
market participants to lock in their trades early.  This outcome may have contributed to the overall poor
showing on the part of the large traders, especially the large seller, and may have been responsible for the
overall  downward pressure  on prices.  Certainly,  the large  traders  in the aggregate  did not exhibit  the
market power which the experimental  design potentially offered them.
Information Impacts
The focus of this section is an econometric  analysis of the impacts of information disclosure  on profits,
prices, and quantities traded between the baseline periods and the disclosure periods. Because these impacts
are different for buyers and sellers, the two groups were analyzed separately. Trader behavior in any given
period can be summarized  as either  a price-dependent  or quantity-dependent  (supply or demand)  rela-
tionship:
(1)  Pt = f(Qt, It, Xt)
and
(2)  Q  = g(Pt, It, Xt),
where P, and Qt refer to prices and quantities  traded,  I  is information provided to subjects, and Xt  is a
vector of other variables which may  affect the estimated price-quantity  relationship, all in time period t.
Our focus is not in the recovery of the supply and demand functions, but in an assessment of information
impacts.  Accordingly,  we rewrite (1)  and (2)  as two "time-specific"  trading periods:
(la)  Pt-I = fa(Qt -1,  It-,,  Xt-1),
(2a)  Q-1 = ga(Pt-1, It-1, Xt_1),
and
(Ib)  Pt+,  = g(Qt+ 1, It+1,  Xt+1),
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Table 4.  Impacts of Information Disclosure  on Changes in Profits, Price, and Quantities Traded for Split
Sample  of Buyers and Sellers
A. BUYERS:
Dependent Variable
DPROFIT  (OLS)  DPRI (2SLS)  DQTY (2SLS)
(a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)
Var.  Name  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est.  Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.
Lagged Dep.  -0.68  -0.63  -0.57  -0.59  38  -0.47
(6.33)  (5.90)  (3.15)  (3.27)  (3.41)  (4.07)
DQTY  -0.59  -0.26
(1.46)  (1.69)
DPRI  -0.25  -0.30
(1.96)  (2.18)
LRGE  -0.33  -0.27  1.72  0.46  -2.10  -3.36
(0.67)  (0.52)  (0.79)  (0.20)  (1.71)  (2.47)
FULL  0.45  0.47  3.01  3.20  0.65  0.88
(0.74)  (0.84)  (1.28)  (1.40)  (0.46)  (0.63)
PART  0.57  -0.09  -0.96
(0.99)  (0.04)  (0.73)
RLRGE  0.70  -8.70  -4.11
(0.72)  (2.10)  (1.42)
RSAME  -4.11  10.22  -3.41
(3.12)  (1.60)  (0.95)
RORD  3.14  -1.00  3.51
(2.37)  (0.17)  (1.04)
RQTY  0.04  -2.65  -1.73
(0.05)  (0.76)  (0.85)
RPRI  0.67  7.16  3.36
(0.73)  (1.87)  (1.32)
INTCPT  4.01  3.62  -3.19  -3.05  9.24  11.40
(5.63)  (5.09)  (1.75)  (1.71)  (2.93)  (3.59)
Efron's R
2 .39  .51  .30  .37  .30  .35
d.f.  67  63  66  62  66  62
Note: Absolute  values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  Critical values for the t-distribution for 60 d.f.  are 2.00,  1.67,
and 1.30 for 5%, 10%, and 20% significance levels (two-tailed test), respectively. Efron's R2is the square of  the correlation
coefficient between the observed  and predicted values of the dependent variable.  For explanation of variables, please
see table  3.
where  t - 1 refers to  trading in a baseline  period  (4 or  7)  and  t +  1 refers  to  trading in the ensuing
disclosure period (5  or 8). Period t is the time between periods  when information  on trading in t - 1 is
disclosed to participants for use in t +  1. Thus, the impacts of information disclosure can be assessed by
differencing  the appropriate  variables in the two sets of equations  to yield:
Pt+I - I =fl(Qt+I - Qt- , It+I - LI-I  Xt+1) (lc)
and
(2c) Qt+  -Qt-1  - gc(Pt+ 1 - Pt-  , It+1  - It,  Xt+ 1)





Pt+, - Pt-  = fd(Qt+  - Qt-1,  It+,  Xt+l)
Qt+l - Qt-i =  gd(Pt+l - Pt-  , It+ , Xt+1).
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Table 4.  Continued
B. SELLERS:
Dependent Variable
DPROFIT  (OLS)  DPRI (2SLS)  DQTY (2SLS)
(a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)
Var. Name  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.  Est. Coeff.
Lagged Dep.  -0.74  -0.74  -0.78  -0.82  -0.62  -0.72
(9.53)  (9.53)  (5.15)  (5.37)  (6.00)  (6.20)
DQTY  0.24  0.48
(0.86)  (1.77)
DPRI  0.08  0.08
(0.76)  (0.83)
LRGE  -1.37  -1.50  -6.23  -7.18  -1.59  -3.42
(3.61)  (3.68)  (3.11)  (3.44)  (1.15)  (2.18)
FULL  -0.56  -0.52  3.61  3.41  0.36  0.67
(1.22)  (1.16)  (1.62)  (1.55)  (0.28)  (0.56)
PART  -0.86  1.72  -2.40
(1.88)  (0.76)  (1.91)
RLRGE  1.51  9.02  3.58
(1.59)  (1.86)  (1.29)
RSAME  1.09  3.60  9.46
(0.88)  (0.57)  (2.66)
RORD  -1.67  -1.29  -6.68
(1.82)  (0.28)  (2.66)
RQTY  -0.04  -2.77  1.66
(0.05)  (0.77)  (0.86)
RPRI  -1.45  -4.89  -3.46
(2.36)  (1.56)  (1.81)
INTCPT  5.02  5.06  -0.34  0.05  15.41  17.89
(7.84)  (7.97)  (0.20)  (0.03)  (5.45)  (5.60)
Efron's R 2 .60  .62  .37  .43  .43  .52
d.f.  67  63  66  62  66  62
Finally, because profits are  the result of price and quantity calculations,  a profit relationship (r)  also can
be estimated in like fashion:
(3) 1t+ 1 - 7rt-_  =  h(P,+ 1 - P,_  ,  +l  - Qt-l  It+l  X+l)
Equations for profits, (quantity-weighted)  contract prices, and quantities traded were estimated using OLS
for the profits equation and 2SLS for the prices and quantities traded equations (due to the simultaneous
determination of prices and quantities traded).6 The dependent variables (DPROFIT, DPRI, and DQTY)
were calculated  as differences  between  their baseline  values in periods 4  and 7  and their values  in the
disclosure  periods,  resulting in 72 observations  each for buyers  and sellers.  Large  trader quantities  and
profits were adjusted (approximately halved) to neutralize the effects of size. Lagged values for DPRI  were
calculated as percentages  of mean  values across  all traders in the baseline  periods (LPRI), while lagged
values for DPROFIT  and DQTY were simply values of profits and quantities traded in periods  4 and 7.
Explanations  for all variables used in the following analyses are found in table 3.
Results are presented in table 4.  Markets were efficient in the sense that dependent  variables and their
lagged values were significantly negatively  related (high profits, prices, and quantities were decreased and
lower  values  were  increased).  The zero-one  variable  associated  with  large  traders (LRGE)  revealed  a
significant profit, price, and quantity disadvantage to the large seller, and a significant quantity disadvantage
to the large buyer. The alternative specifications in columns (a) and (b) differ only in the manner in which
the partial disclosure treatment  is incorporated  into the equation.  In the column (a) equations,  the full
and partial disclosure impacts are  evaluated  using zero-one variables (FULL, PART) for the two treat-
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ments. No significant  differences  were detected between  no disclosure and  full disclosure for any of the
dependent variables (at the 10% significance level) in this specification. Seller profits were hurt, however,
by partial disclosure, due largely to quantity decreases.
The specific information requests obtained under partial disclosure are modeled explicitly in the column
(b) equations.  The information  selection  variables  (RLRGE, RSAME,  RORD, RQTY,  and RPRI) are
zero-one variables. Each of these variables was assigned  a value of one when it had been selected as one
of the two  choices  in the preceding  partial  disclosure  selection  process.  Since  choosing  any particular
trader-trade  set  of information  on  the  first choice neither necessitated  nor  precluded  selection  of any
information as a second  choice, there was no problem of multicollinearity  or interdependence.
For  the buyers,  information  requests  for  order  of trades  (RORD) were  the  most  helpful,  due to  a
combination  of lower prices and increased quantities traded. Requests  for information  on  traders from
the same side of the market (RSAME), on the other hand, were significantly negatively related to changes
in buyer profits, due to higher purchase  prices and decreased quantities traded.  Information requests for
large traders (RLRGE) significantly decreased buyer prices, but decreases in quantities traded neutralized
impacts  on profits.  Price  information  requests  (RPRI) paradoxically  resulted  in  higher buyer  prices.
Requests for quantity information (RQTY) were insignificant throughout for both buyers and sellers. For
the sellers, information requests for large traders enhanced both the selling price and the quantity traded,
with a marginally significant positive impact on profits. Price information requests decreased profits, due
to lower  selling prices  and fewer  units  sold.  Order requests  also decreased  profits  due to a significant
reduction in the quantity sold. Information requests for traders on the same side of the market increased
the quantity sold, but had no significant impact on profits.
Determinants  of Information Selection
An analysis of the determinants of information  selection under partial disclosure is presented in table 5.
Probit analysis was applied to the 96 observations  of requests for information (2  requests per trader*6
traders*2 periods per session*4 sessions) over five categories of  requests: RLRGE, RSAME, RORD, RQTY,
and RPRI, all as defined above. Coefficients are presented in table 5 together with their associated t-statistics
(absolute values) in parentheses and changes in probabilities in brackets. The coefficients are interpreted
as the direction  and  magnitude  of change  along  the horizontal  axis  of the  normal  probability  density
function given a one-unit change in the right-hand-side  variable.7
Explanatory variables include "economic"  variables (price and quantity information from the previous
period), market indicator variables (size and side of the market), and period- and session-specific indicator
variables.  The economic variables include LPRI and LQTY  (the trader's percentages of mean price and
quantity from the previous period), NTRDS (the number of trades in the previous period), and SLPRI,
an interactive term  calculated as  LPRI multiplied by a zero-one  seller variable  (SLR) and designed to
capture  the differential  price  impacts  facing  sellers  as opposed  to buyers.  Market  indicator  variables
included SLR and a zero-one indicator for large traders (LRGE). Other indicator variables reflected low
price equilibrium periods (EQ60), period 8 (PD8), and three of the four partial disclosure sessions (SN1,
SN2, and SN8). Most of these period- and session-specific indicator variables were insignificant throughout.
This result is the desired outcome, since it implies that the experimental design was not seriously flawed
(i.e., that there were no differences in session or period outcomes not accounted for by other right-hand-
side variables).
The coefficients and summary statistics in table 5 reveal three equations (RSAME, RORD, and RQTY)
with a  number of significant  explanatory  variables  and  reasonably strong  goodness-of-fit  measures  (as
reflected in R2values and percentage of correct predictions) and two equations (RLRGE and RPRI) with
only a few significant explanatory variables and weaker goodness-of-fit measures.  The RLRGE equation
has the lowest percentage of correct predictions and the lowest R2 (both McFadden's and Efron's), and is
the only equation besides RQTY where the chi-square  statistic for the likelihood ratio test (that all slope
coefficients  are  zero)  is  not  significant at  the  10%  level.  The  only  meaningful  significant  explanatory
variable in the RLRGE equation indicates that large traders tended not to select information on the other
large  trader.  RPRI, the equation with the second lowest percentage  of correct predictions, was the only
equation with no significant economic or market indicator explanatory variables.
RSAME,  RORD, and RQTY each  had at least  four  significant explanatory  variables,  with  SLR,  its
interactive  price term (SLPRI),  and LRGE all significantly different from zero  (at the  10%  level) in all
three  equations.  The  previous  period  percentage  deviation  from  quantity  (LQTY)  was important  in
information  requests on order and quantity (RORD and RQTY), while the number of trades  (NTRDS)
and  the previous  period  percentage  deviation  from price  (LPRI) were  significant  only  in the  RQTY
equation.  The largest  changes  in probability  occurred  with the noncontinuous  variables  in the  RORD
equation. The probability of order information being selected increased  42% and 38% when the requestor
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RLRGE  RSAME  RORD  RQTY  RPRI
Number of iterations  3  6  5  5  3
Log of likelihood
function  -57.81  -24.56  -40.82  -36.64  -57.10
Likelihood ratio test  10.34  27.02  32.43  13.23  17.85
d.f.  11  11  11  11  11
McFadden's  R2 .08  .35  .28  .15  .14
Efron's R2 .09  .34  .33  .13  .18
Percent  correct
predictions  65.6  90.6  78.1  83.3  71.9
Note:  A  single asterisk indicates  significance  at the  10% level;  double asterisks indicate  significance  at the 5% level
(two-tailed test). For explanation of variables, please see table  3.
a Coefficients  on LPRI and SLR are estimated, not adjusted (see text).
b Absolute  values of asymptotic  t-statistics are  in parentheses.
c Changes  in probability  of information  selection given  a  one-unit change  in  the associated  variable  (calculated at
variable  means) are in brackets.
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was a seller or a large trader,  respectively,  and decreased  15% with an increase  in the number of trades.
In general,  these  three variables  accounted  for greater  changes in probability  than  either the remaining
indicator variables or the continuous variables.
Discussion  and Conclusions
The surprising outcome from this analysis of experimental data is the impacts of size. The table 5 results
suggest  that large traders had the greatest impacts on information selection, both in terms of significant
coefficients  and changes in probability.  In table 4, the  significant negative  sign  on LRGE in the sellers'
price  and profits equations  and the significant  enhancements  provided  by RLRGE to both buyers' and
sellers' prices seem to indicate that, ceteris  paribus,  a perception of size as being important actually resulted
in size hurting a trader. Furthermore, RLRGE was the only information variable in table 4 with a positive
impact on  profits for both sellers and buyers.  Clearly the impacts of the large traders were being felt by
the  other traders. It almost  seems as if their very  presence and  the fear they may have generated  gave
them market liability instead of  market power. Other traders may have "ganged-up" on them and exploited
their cumbersome  size from the very beginning.
As a quality check, mean profits were calculated for all 12 sessions over only the early trading periods
3 and 4 (with the large traders' profits adjusted as suggested earlier). In period 3 the large traders averaged
$5.21, with $5.13  going to the large buyers and $5.29 to the large sellers. The four small traders averaged
$6.18,  ranging from $4.59  to $7.55  per period.  The period 4 results showed  an even  more pronounced
bias against the large traders, who averaged only $4.94 compared to the small traders at $6.28. The large
seller's profit of $5.01  was the larger of the two large traders' profits, but was less than the lowest of the
small traders' individual  profits of $5.68.  Thus, both periods 3 and 4 seemed to reflect early diminished
profits for the large traders. Some researchers maintain that a concentrated industry characterized by large
firms  is inherently inefficient,  since  large  firms  are  slow  and  awkward  adjusters  to  changes  in market
conditions.  These results provide support for this conjecture.
A second observation is that the economic content of market information may be less helpful than the
source of the information  disclosure.  Requests for price information (RPRI) were hurtful in table 4 for
both buyers and sellers, while requests for quantity information were insignificant in all equations on both
sides of the market.  In addition, except for a few cases, it is hard to find significant economic content in
the determinants of information selection in table 5. On the other hand, information on large traders was
helpful throughout  (as noted  above),  while  information  on traders  from  the same  side  of the market
enhanced the sellers'  quantity sold and information on  the order of trades  significantly  increased  buyer
profits. The implication is that, in this information processing age,  the higher value information may be
any information which can be obtained from the larger competitors, with the content of the information
inherently less valuable. One further surprise with respect to information selection was the tendency for
sellers  not to request information  on prices.  The new two-tiered rail contract disclosure regime places  a
very high value on rate information,  but with all bits of information equally costly and accessible in the
experimental  setting,  sellers chose order-of-trade  information more often than price information.
Straightforward extension of these results to the potential impact of information disclosure on rail rates
between  grain  shippers and railroads  in the Central/South  Plains  is difficult,  although certain inferences
can be drawn. The first is that although there appears to have been no early bias to the advantage of either
side of the market,  sellers were quickly taken down as trading progressed through the six trading periods.
Period 3 profits saw sellers averaging $6.52 and buyers averaging $5.20 per trader. In period 4 profit gaps
narrowed and profit patterns reversed, with buyers averaging $6.10 and sellers averaging $5.57 per trader,
in spite of no information dissemination between periods 3 and 4. The gap continued to narrow through
the remaining  periods  and the  buyer  dominance  continued,  as  buyers  averaged  $5.93  over  periods  5
through 8, with sellers  averaging $5.72  per trader. The table 4 results revealed some price advantage  to
the sellers  with  full information  disclosure,  implying  that either time or  partial information  disclosure
was to the benefit of the buyers. This leads  to the second inference we can draw,  that when sellers have
no information  on  competitors'  prices, they may be more  aggressive  and more  "willing to  deal."  Full
disclosure may allow for some price coordination,  removing  a measure  of competition  from among the
sellers and resulting in price increases. The full disclosure results do support Hong and Plott, and Grether
and Plott, who found that posted  prices led to higher prices.
These results also are consistent with recent econometric evidence based on an analysis of geographic
price spreads which shows that real rail rates over the study region's major transportation corridors have
edged upward since the implementation of the information disclosure policy (Fuller, Ruppel, and Bessler).
Furthermore,  rate disclosure may be responsible for the reduced use of grain transport contracts.  In 1986
an estimated  63%  of rail grain moved under contract,  whereas  by  1988  the share had dropped to  40%
(Association of American Railroads). If increased contracting was in fact responsible for lower rates during
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the early  Staggers years, the fear of information disclosure requirements may be directly or inadvertently
linked to the decreased number of contracts,  thereby contributing to higher rates.
[Received November 1990; final revision received October 1991.]
Notes
That is, prices may increase, decrease,  or remain relatively unchanged and market efficiency  may be enhanced or
impeded.
2 Data  generated  by  the  experiment  were  also  used  in  an  assessment  of market  efficiency  (Ruppel, Fuller,  and
McKnight).  That study, which  used analysis of variance techniques, contains  greater detail on the study region under
consideration.
3 In pilot runs, a tendency  had been observed for second and third trades  between identical subjects at "distorted"
prices  or involving only a few units traded. The intent behind placing the limitation on the number of trades  was to
diminish the likelihood of these "meaningless"  transactions.
4 See the appendices in Ruppel, Fuller, and McKnight for sample low demand-low  supply resale and cost schedules
and for detailed participant instructions.
5 No prior information  was given  to participants  about minimum payouts, but when  earnings  were low,  subjects
were  paid a  minimum of $10  per session. The  highest  payout  for  an individual participant  was  $27.  Over  all  12
sessions, the total payout was 97.4% of the expected payout.
6 Either prices or quantities could be estimated in a system, but not both. These 2SLS equations are separate estimates
of the same system, but reflect how the information variables  affect the dependent variables  differently.
7 Modified coefficients  are relevant for the two variables which constitute an interaction term (SLR and LPRI). These
modified  coefficients  were  used  in  calculating changes  in  probabilities  for  these  two variables,  although  the  actual
estimated coefficients are reported in table 5.
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